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IN THE~ SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVA M. REES SCOTT, 
Plaivntiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 8968 
MOLEN N. R.EES, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE1IENT OF FACTS 
On March 17, 1958, the District Court of Salt Lake 
County entered a Decree of Divorce in the above entitled 
case, pursuant to which defendant was awarded a decree 
of divorce and a division of the property of the parties 
was made (R-2). 
This decree awarded the care, custody and control 
of the two minor children of the parties to plaintiff dur-
ing the months of September through June, inclusive, 
of each year and upon alternate Thanksgiving and 
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Christmas holidays, and to the defendant during the 
months of July and August of each year and during the 
Christmas and Thanksgiving holidays of every other 
year. Defendant was ordered to pay the sum of $250.00 
per month for the support of the children during the 
periods of plaintiff's custody (R-2, 3). 
The children are a girl, who is now six years old, 
and a boy, who is now two years old (R-20). 
The Decree specifically provided that in the event 
plaintiff resided with the minor children outside the 
jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff was to pay the 
transportation of the children to and from the place of 
abode of defendant for his period of custody entitlement 
(R-2, 3). It further provided that defendant would have 
the privilege of reasonable visitation with the children 
while they were in plaintiff's custody but his transporta-
tion in visiting the children would be at his own expense 
(R-3). The Decree further provided that plaintiff could 
not remove the children from the jurisdiction of the court 
without first applying to the court for an order permit-
ting the removal (R-3). 
Pursuant to the decree, plaintiff had custody of the 
children until July 1, 1958 and defendant had their cus-
tody from July 1st to Septe1nber 1, 1958. Since Septem-
ber 1, 1958 the children have been in plaintiff's custody 
( R-32, 34, 35). 
On June 21, 1958 the plaintiff married Dr. Edward 
B. Scott, a resident of North Hollywood, California (R-
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17, 18; Ex. P-1). Since the marriage Appellant has es-
tablished a home in North Hollywood, California, with 
her husband, which is located in a good neighborhood and 
in good surroundings for the rearing of children (R-8). 
On the 29th of August, 1958, plaintiff served on de-
fendant and his counsel and filed a motion in accordance 
with the decree of divorce for permission to remove the 
children to her residence in the state of California during 
the period from September through June of each year. 
This motion was accompanied by plaintiff's affidavit 
(R-5 to 8). Defendant filed an affidavit in opposition 
to this motion and the matter was heard September 9, 
1958. 
The evidence relative to the home and circumstances 
of plaintiff and her husband is uncontradicted. It shows 
that the home established by plaintiff and her husband 
in California is located in close proximity to good schools 
and church facilities (Exhs. P-2 to P-8; R-18, 19, 20). 
The home has a bedroom for each of the children, has a 
large yard in which the children can play and a patio-
barbecue area (R-18). Plaintiff and her husband have 
redecorated the bedroom for the little girl and Dr. Scott 
constructed a sandbox area and acquired toys for the 
children in anticipation of their coming to live with them 
(R-21). 
Plaintiff's husband desires that the children come to 
reside with plaintiff and him during the period of plain-
tiff's custody entitlement (R-21) and he has a great 
amount of affection for the children (R-8). Plaintiff 
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testified that her husband continually talks about the 
children and what will be in their best interests when 
they reside with plaintiff and him (R-21). 
The uncontroverted evidence at the hearing further 
shows that were it not for her marriage to Dr. Scott, 
plaintiff would be required to seek employment to pro-
vide for herself, but by reason of her marriage to Dr. 
Scott this is not necessary (R-25,30). Dr. Scott has a net 
income of approximately $2,000.00 per month in his 
practice as an anesthesiologist on the staff of the Chil-
dren's Hospital in Los Angeles, California (R-23, R-21). 
By reason of this situation plaintiff will be able to de-
vote her full attention to providing the chidren with a 
mother's loving care and affection and in making a good 
environment for them (R-25; R-8). 
Prior to establishing residence in California, Dr. 
Scott had been engaged in the practice of medicine in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Before the marriage of Plaintiff and 
Dr. Scott, he had established his residence in California. 
By moving to California he achieved certain very definite 
advantages for himself in his profession . .Among these 
were the fact that he could obtain a shorter preceptorship 
in California, he has available to hiin the facilities for 
intensive research in the field of hypothenny, w·hich is 
the use of freezing as an anesthesia for operations, and 
has the opportunity of doing a large a1nount of teaching 
work in the hospital (R-24). In addition to these factors, 
there was considerable uncertainty as to the future of 
anesthesiologists in Utah hospitals at the time he left 
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here. This arose out of a movement on the part of certain 
hospitals in the region to require anesthesiologists to 
work on a salary basis in the hospitals rather than per-
mitting them to have a private practice of medicine such 
as other doctors have. Dr. Scott did not want to work on 
such a salary arrangement but rather was interested only 
in engaging in the private practice of his specialty 
(R-75). 
Following the hearing the Court entered an order 
denying plaintiff's motion, stating that "the remarriage 
of plaintiff presents a possible unstable home situation 
and time is needed in which to determine whether or not 
the home of plaintiff and her new husband is suitable for 
rearing the minor children of the parties." The order 
further provided that plaintiff would be permitted to 
re-apply for permission to remove the children frmn 
the State of Utah, at any time after January 1, 1959 but 
made the granting of such permission expressly condi-
tional upon the testimony of plaintiff's new husband 
being offered at that time in order that the court might 
determine the fitness of the home for the children. 
This appeal is taken from that order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT ONE .. 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT UNDER THE 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO CALI-
FORNIA CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISCRETION. 
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POINT TWO 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DURING THE PERIOD FROM 
SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE OF EACH YEAR, IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
POINT THREE 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE FIND-
INGS CONTAINED THEREIN ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 




THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT UNDER THE 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO CALI-
FORNIA CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISCRETION. 
The Utah statute governing the role of the court in 
connection with supplemental proceedings following di-
vorce decrees is section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. This provides : 
" * * * Such subsequent changes or new 
orders may be made by the court with respect to 
the disposal of the children or the distribution of 
property as shall be reasonable and proper." 
Within the framework of this statute, the Courts 
have construed the function of the court in connection 
with custody 1natters to he that of determining what is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
in the best interests and welfare of the minor children, 
and have concluded that this is a matter which rests 
largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. It has 
been said that the orders of the trial court will not be 
upset unless there is an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. 
Applying these rules to the instant case, it is sub-
mitted that by no stretch of the imagination could the 
trial court's order be said to be reasonable and proper. 
Rather it represents a grevious departure from realities, 
disregarding the effects it will have, resulting in the 
creation of a very brutal situation. 
Analysis of the order shows that it does two things: 
First, it leaves the custody of the children who are of 
tender ages with their mother, but for the present re-
quires that she keep them in Utah where she does not 
have a home. Secondly, looking to the future, it requires 
that plaintiff and her husband conduct their lives to. 
gether so that some additional showing can be made that 
their home life is not unstable, after which impliedly 
plaintiff may return to California with her children to 
to be with her husband. 
By examing how this order works out in practice, 
it becomes manifest that the first part of the order pre-
vents plaintiff from meeting the requirements of the 
second portion of the order. One can readily see how the 
order itself places appellant in a grievous dilemma. She 
must either stay with her children in Utah and establish 
a home apart from her husband, or desert her children 
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and go home to her husband in California. If she follows 
the former course, she will not be in position to offer 
any additional evidence that she has a stable home sit-
uation with her husband since she will not have lived 
with him. If she follows the latter course of rejoining her 
husband, it would rightly be said that she has more in-
terest in her life with her husband than in her children's 
welfare. 
Can it conceivably be said that an order which cre-
ates such a situation is "reasonable and proper~" Can 
it be said that placing the children where there is no 
home for them and denying their going where there is 
a home for them is in their best interests~ When a court 
indulges in n1ere conjecture that there is a "possible un-
stable home situation," can it be said that this is the 
exercise of sound discretion~ 
To say the least, the trial court's order is not con-
ducive to the establishment of a '"stable home situation" 
if there were not one at the previous hearing. If plain-
tiff is motivated primarily by n1other love and remains 
with her children, as she has done, how stable will the 
home situation appear after January 1, 1959 (when plain-
tiff is permitted to reapply for re1noval) when the evi-
dence is adduced that from the time of the last order 
she has not lived in the same house with her husbandf 
The trial court's order itself prevents the maintenance 
of a stable home situation, and on the contrary is dis-
rupting the home situation heretofore established. 
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The effect of this order on the children can only be 
harmful. The frustrations of their mother being forced 
by the court order to live away from her home can only 
be reflected in the children's environment. The instability 
of the children being in a temporary housing situation 
rather than becoming established in a permanent home 
is certainly not in their best interest and welfare. 
Divorces of couples with minor children cannot help 
but have a deleterious effect upon the children. Unfor-
tunately there does not appear to be any solution which 
would be completely satisfactory in insulating children 
from the unhappiness of their parents. When a divorce 
becomes an accomplished fact, the role of a court should 
be to make the readjustment which the children must go 
through as easy as possible for them. Its province is 
certainly not that of doing anything to further disrupt 
the situation such as the trial court has done here. 
It is submitted that given the factual situation of 
a woman who has married a man whose professional 
career dictates his residing outside the state of Utah, and 
who has established a home in which the children can 
be reared with their mother being able to devote her full 
attention to providing them with a mother's loving care, 
the trial court has needlessly injected a decidedly dis-
rupting influence. The trial court's order will be a con-
tinual source of disruption so long as it is in effect, and 
cannot, by its very terms, result in termination of this 
dilemma. 
As will be pointed out subsequently 1n this brief, 
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the trial court made its finding of "a possible unstable 
home situation" without any evidence whatsoever of any-
thing but a suitable home situation. The court has with-
drawn itself entirely from the evidence before it in ar-
riving at this finding. If such a course were permissible, 
it is altogether possible that the home situation of every 
person in the nation could be declared to represent "a 
possible unstable home situation.'' Certainly it is possible 
to think of something in any person's background, per-
sonality, or behavior which, when equated with similar 
or dissimilar characteristics in their spouse, could form 
a foundation upon which we might conjecture that their 
marriage might present a "possible unstable home sit-
uation." For the court to permit itself to indulge in such 
conjecture, and to use this as the basis for an order such 
as here is involved is certainly a most flagrant abuse of 
discretion. 
POINT TWO 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION TO REMOVE HER CHILDREN TO THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DURING THE PERIOD FROM 
SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE OF EACH YEAR, IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
The decree of divorce entered in March, 1958, 
awarded the minor children to plaintiff's custody for 
the period from September through June, inclusive, of 
each year. This decree was not appealed fron1 by either 
party and therefore is res adjudicata of 1natters occuring 
prior to the hearing of the divorce action. In1plicit in the 
award of the children's custody to plaintiff is the fact 
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that the court found nothing in plaintiff's demeanor or 
conduct as relates to the children which would make 
her an unfit person to have their custody. In view of 
the ages of the children, the girl six years and the boy 
two years, this decision of the trial court was in keeping 
with this court's ruling in the case of Hulse vs Hulse, 
(1947) 176 Pac 2d 875, where it was said: 
"This court has previously held in construing 
40-3-5 of our statutes, that even in a contested 
case where the husband is awarded the divorce, if 
the children of the parties are of tender age, they 
will ordinarily be awarded to the custody of their 
mother, with provision being made in the decree 
for the father to support those children." 
See also: Anderson vs. Anderson (1946), 110 Utah 300, 
172 Pac 2d 132; Holm vs Holm, 44 Utah 242,139 Pac. 937. 
By its order of September 25, 1958, the trial court 
again impliedly finds that the best interests of the chil-
dren will be served by being with their mother. 
Under these circumstances, the sole question then is 
whether or not the trial court was correct in ruling that 
the children should not be removed from the state of 
Utah while they are in appellant's custody. 
This court in the case of Griffith vs. Griffith, 18 
Utah 98, 55 Pac. 84, adopted the rule that where the 
circumstances justify it, the children of divorced couples 
may be removed from the state. In that case the custody 
of the children had been awarded to the mother. The 
mother's parents resided in Iowa. The trial court had 
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ruled that the children could not be removed from Utah. 
In reversing the trial court's order forbidding the re-
moval, the court says: 
"The defendant assigns as error so much of 
the findings and decree as forbids the defendant 
from taking her son beyond the limits of this 
state. It appears from the evidence that defen-
dant's parents reside in the State of Iowa, where 
she lived until recently. Her welfare and the best 
interests of the child might demand a return to 
her parents and friends there, though outside of 
the state. We are of the opinion that so much of 
the findings, conclusions of law, and the decree as 
forbids her from taking her son beyond the state 
without the consent of the plaintiff, is erroneous." 
The case of Kirby vs Kirby, 126 Wash. 530, 219 Pac. 
27, involves a factual situation very close to that involved 
here. An application to modify a decree covering custody 
of a child was made to permit the mother to move with 
the child to New York. The decree gave custody to 
the mother at all times during the school year and to the 
father during the summer vacations and one week at 
Christmas time. The decree provided that the mother 
could not remove the child from the jurisdiction without 
the consent of the father or the order of the court. The 
mother had remarried and her husband had a better 
job opportunity in New York. The court reversed the 
trial court's order refusing penuission to rmuove the 
child from Washington, saying: 
"In cases of this kind, the matter of first im-
portance is the welfare of the child. If the step-
father can improve his business connections and 
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associations, he treating the child as though it 
were his own, a better business connection cannot 
help but have a resultant beneficial effect insofar 
as the child is concerned. The respondent has not 
married since the decree of divorce, but maintains 
a home with his two sisters, young women, both 
of whom are employed a greater portion of the 
time. If the decree is not modified permitting the 
child to be taken to New York, it would result in 
Mr. McCluske's remaining in Seattle when better 
business connections would dictate his going to 
New York, or that he would be required to main-
tain his family in the State of Washington, while 
he resided in New York. This would be, in effect, 
breaking up the family. Courts have not hesitated 
to permit a parent, to whom a child has been 
awarded in a divorce action, to take it to another 
state, or even to a foreign country, when the best 
interests of the child would be promoted thereby. 
(Citing cases)" 
This case was followed in the cases of Jeschke vs. 
Jeschke, (1943) 16 Wash. 2d 617, 134 Pac. 2d 464, and 
Goade vs. Goade (1944) Wash., 145 Pac. 2d 886. A simi-
lar ruling is to be found in Commonwealth Ex Rei Balla 
vs Wreski, (1949) 165 Pa. Super 6, 67 Atl. 2d 595; 
Wallace vs. Wallace (1910) 26 S. Dak. 229, 128 N. W. 
143; Lane v. Lane (1945) Mo. App., 186 S.W. 2d 47; 
Mattox vs. Mattox (1929) 129 Okla. 301; 264 Pac. 898; 
Santo vs. Santo, (1949) Colorado, 206 Pac. 2d 341. 
In examining the instant case in the light of these 
rulings, certain salient points stand out. Without her 
marriage to Dr. Scott, appellant would be required to ob-
tain employment to provide for her support. As it is, she 
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can now devote her full time and attention to providing 
the children with a good home and in giving them a 
mother's loving care and attention. By reason of her 
marriage to Dr. Scott, a man who is able to provide 
adequately for his family's needs, appellant can provide 
the children with better facilities than she could had 
she not married and was having to provide for herself. 
The home into which the children will be placed 
is a nice one in a good neighborhood which will provide 
the children with very good surroundings. These factors 
make it very decidedly to the best interests of the chil-
dren that appellant has married Dr. Scott. To let state 
lines interfere with this situation is rather pointless. 
Dr. Scott has very definite advantages in his pro-
fessional connections in California which dictate that he 
should reside there. For the court by its order to force 
a breakup of the home which appellant and her husband 
have established for themselves and the children is erron-
eous and contrary to the decided cases on the point.· 
The trial court has over looked the ~1arch 17, 1958, 
decree in making its ruling. It was clearly contemplated 
in that decree that appellant would establish a residence 
outside of Utah. All of the mechanical and other pro-
blems incident to having appellant reside outside the 
state, such as getting children to and from the state, and 
defendant's being able to visit the children, were care-
fully covered in that decree. It is submitted that the 
requirement. of obtaining the court's permission for re-
moval was inserted into that order for the sole reason 
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that the court could determine that appellant would make 
adequate arrangements for the care of the children in 
establishing her residence outside the state. This she has 
certainly done. 
Nor is this a situation where the removal from the 
state would deprive respondent from having the compan-
ionship of his children and being able to exert his influ-
ence and guidance over them. He has custody during 
the summer months when the children are not in school, 
and at times when he can spend more time with them. In 
view of the difficulties which have occurred between 
plaintiff and defendant in connection with the visitation 
rights while the children have been in appellant's custody, 
it is submitted that it will certainly be less disturbing on 
the children that they do not experience fights and squab-
bles between their parents such as they have been sub-
jected to since the entry of the March decree. 
If the trial court's order is affirmed, it would re-
quire appellant to establish quarters for the children in 
Utah for ten months a year, and spend ten months of a 
year away from her home in California. From this 
nothing is gained that would not be better accomplished 
by the children's going to California with her where she 
can make a permanent home for them for those ten 
months a year and more adequately provide for them. 
POINT THREE 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE FIND-
INGS CONTAINED THEREIN ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION. 
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In its order the trial court finds that "the remarriage 
of plaintiff presents a possible unstable home situation 
and time is needed in which to determine whether or not 
the home of plaintiff and her new husband is suitable 
for rearing the minor children of the parties hereto.'' 
This finding contained in the order is not supported 
in any manner by the evidence presented to the Court. 
There is not a scintilla of evidence to support any such 
finding. On the contrary the entire evidence in the record 
relative to the home and home life of appellant and her 
husband reflects the very best of circumstances. 
The court after finding "a possible unstable home 
situation" without any evidence to support it, then pro-
ceeds from this premise to conclude that more time is 
needed to determine whether or not the home of plaintiff 
and Dr. Scott is suitable for rearing the children, follow-
ing which the Court apparently concludes they should 
then be removed to California. 
It is submitted that this premise unsupported by 
evidence of any kind is the basis upon which the court 
has concluded the children should be kept by appellant 
in the State of Utah for the present. Obviousl3T the Court 
concluded that the children should remain in appellant's 
custody, since that is its order. The onl~T basis upon 
which it could have concluded that this custody should 
not be in California with her husband was that expressed 
by this unsupported finding. 
It is submitted that the only element of instability 
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which is to be found in the case at bar is that which is 
the result of the trial court's order itself. The frustration 
of a 1nother and wife torn between being with her chil-
dren on the one hand and with her husband on the other, 
and having no cause for this situation except that a 
Court has decreed it shall be so, would certainly add a 
substantial measure of instability to the most stable of 
homes. 
Further the Court in its Order requires that the 
testimony of appellant's husband should be offered as a 
condition to the granting of permission to remove in the 
future. It is appellant's contention that the husband's 
testimony is not mandatory in a hearing such as this. 
The case of Aiken vs. Aiken, (1947) 120 Montana 344, 185 
Pac. 2d 294, was a case quite similar to the case at bar, 
where the mother, to whom custody of a minor child had 
been awarded remarried a man in Colorado and reques-
ted permision to remove the child from Montana to Colo-
rado. The trial court granted the permission, and on 
appeal the father had contended that since the new 
husband's testimony had not been offered, the trial 
court's ruling was error. The Court in that case said: 
"Here defendant is obliged to make her res-
idence with that of her husband in Denver, Colo·-
rado. The court did not abuse its discretion In 
authorizing her to take Russell with her. * * * 
"The legal custody is with defendant and 
not with her husband, and if her husband does 
not properly treat the child, that might furnish 
grounds for changing the custody in the future. 
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but we think his silence cannot prevent the mother 
who has the custody, from taking the child to the 
state where she is obliged to live." 
Appellant testified that Dr. Scott has a great amount 
of affection for the children and desires to have them 
come to California to reside with appellant and him. This 
evidence stands unrebutted, and it is not the Court's 
prerogative to specify how evidence shall be presented 
to it nor what witness shall testify before it. 
In conclusion, it is appellant's contention that the 
trial court's order in denying appellant's motion to re-
move the children from Utah to California during the 
period of her custody entitlement under the ~1arch 17, 
1958 decree represents a gross abuse of discretion and 
of itself creates a brutally impossible situation. The 
trial court by both of its orders has found that the chil-
dren should be with appellant during the period from 
September through June of each year, and that such is 
in their best interests. The cases which have been decided 
involving the removal of children frmn one state to an-
other have held that state lines can be no barrier incus-
tody matters where the best interests of the children will 
be subserved thereby. The Court has ignored the evidence 
before it in determining that there is "a possible unstable 
home situation", and has in fact pennitted itself to in-
dulge in mere conjecture, when the evidence before it was 
completely contran· to such a finding. In --riew of the 
holding of the Court that the rnstody of the children 
should remain with appellant, it becomes apparent that 
they can be better cared for in California, where plain-
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tiff and her husband have a good home for them in good 
surroundings, than in the State of Utah where appellant 
has no home, where any arrangements for the children 
would be makeshift, and where plaintiff will be separated 
from her husband. 
It is respectively submitted that the order of the 
trial court should be reversed and the appellant's motion 
to remove the children from Utah to California for the 
period of appellant's custody under the decree of divorce 
of Th1arch 17, 1958, should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & 
LOWE, and THOMAS C. 
CUTHBER.T, 
.Attorneys for .Appellant. 
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